Execution in an aggregator by Oomen, Roel
  
Roel Oomen 
Execution in an aggregator 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Oomen, Roel (2016) Execution in an aggregator. Quantitative Finance. pp. 1-22. ISSN 1469-
7688 
 
DOI: 10.1080/14697688.2016.1201589 
 
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67454/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Execution in an aggregator
Roel Oomen∗
June, 2016
Abstract
An aggregator is a technology that consolidates liquidity – in the form of bid and ask prices and amounts –
from multiple sources into a single unified order book to facilitate “best-price” execution. It is widely used by
traders in financial markets, particularly those in the globally fragmented spot currency market. In this paper, I
study the properties of execution in an aggregator where multiple liquidity providers compete for a trader’s un-
informed flow. There are two main contributions. Firstly, I formulate a model for the liquidity dynamics and
contract formation process, and use this to characterise key trading metrics such as, the observed inside spread
in the aggregator, the reject rate due to the so-called “last-look” trade acceptance process, the effective spread that
the trader pays, as well as the market share and gross revenues of the liquidity providers. An important observa-
tion here is that aggregation induces adverse selection where the liquidity provider that receives the trader’s deal
request will suffer from the “Winner’s curse”, and this effect grows stronger when the trader increases the number
of participants in the aggregator. To defend against this, the model allows liquidity providers to adjust the nom-
inal spread they charge or alter the trade acceptance criteria. This interplay is a key determinant of transaction
costs. Secondly, I analyse the properties of different execution styles. I show that when the trader splits her order
across multiple liquidity providers, a single provider that has quick market access and for whom it is relatively
expensive to internalise risk, can effectively force all other providers to join her in externalising the trader’s flow
thereby maximising the market impact and aggregate hedging costs. It is therefore not only the number, but also
the type of liquidity provider and execution style adopted by the trader that determines transaction costs.
∗Roel Oomen is employed as the global co-head of electronic FX spot trading at Deutsche Bank AG. The views and opinions rendered in this paper reflect
the author’s personal views about the subject and do not necessarily represent the views of Deutsche Bank AG or any part thereof. This article is necessarily
general and is not intended to be comprehensive, nor does it constitute legal or financial advise in relation to any particular situation. Oomen would like to
thank two anonymous referees, Natalia Fabra, Alex Gerko, Søren Johansen, Anthony Neuberger, Mark Podolskij, colleagues at Deutsche Bank, and the seminar
participants at the London School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and the “Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets” conference at the
Cambridge-INET Institute for helpful comments.
1 Introduction
How do you secure a fair price in a fragmented market where the same product can be traded in different venues? If
you contact a single dealer you may not get the best price available, whereas approaching all dealers may be imprac-
tical or too costly. A common approach, greatly facilitated by e-commerce developments over the past two decades,
is to query a representative panel of dealers and then to transact with the one that provides the best price (e.g. car
insurance, electronics, airline tickets, hotel rooms). Financial markets work in much the same way, particularly the
over-the-counter markets where there is no centralised exchange. A prime example here is spot foreign exchange:
the biggest financial market in the world (BIS, 2014), where a large and diverse set of liquidity providers (LPs) stand
ready to buy and sell currencies on a bi-lateral and disclosed basis. To source liquidity, traders routinely put multiple
LPs in competition and then transact with the one that offers the best price. To facilitate this process, aggregators
are used: a technology that consolidates liquidity, in the form of bid- and offer-prices and amounts, from various
sources into a single consolidated order book. But in a market where the terms of trade are privately negotiated
and the liquidity provided is bespoke to the trader, deciding on a suitable aggregation setup is not a trivial task. For
instance, how many LPs should the trader include into her aggregator? If there is heterogeneity across LPs, how to
choose amongst them? Or perhaps, when the marginal costs are negligible, the trader should simply include them
all? Once the setup is defined, the trader then needs to decide on how to execute within the aggregator. For large
amounts, should she trade with the LP that provides the best price in that amount, or should she spread execution
across multiple LPs trading only a portion of the order with each but perhaps at a tighter spread? And what is the
impact of execution uncertainty on transaction costs when the LP rejects the trader’s request to deal? In this paper
I provide insights into these type of questions. On the basis of a model for the liquidity dynamics and contract for-
mation process, I establish the determining factors of transaction costs associated with execution in an aggregator.
The model assumes a setup where multiple competing LPs provide liquidity for a specified security in a standard
amount at a nominal spread centred around their best but imperfect estimates of the unobserved true or efficient
price. The trader uses an aggregator to consolidate the liquidity provided and trades with the LP that shows the best
price. She is assumed to be uninformed with respect to the future evolution of the price process and her liquidity
demand is exogenously motivated, i.e. a “noise” trader in Kyle (1985) terminology. The LPs that participate in the
aggregator each contribute a continuous stream of bid- and ask-prices without knowing what their competitors are
showing (this is a key difference with exchange based trading where a market maker can observe the central limit
order book prior to submitting an interest). The liquidity they provide is indicative: the prices and amounts are
available to the trader for use in a deal request for consideration by the LP who will subsequently make an accept or
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reject decision. As such, the contract formation process is one where finality of the deal resides with the LP. In prac-
tice, the trade acceptance process serves a critical role that lets the LP – for instance – check whether sufficient credit
is available to satisfy the deal request, ensure trades are conducted at valid prices for allowable amounts, manage its
exposures when it simultaneously provides liquidity to a large number of traders, and prevent uncontrolled trading
over a system outage or market dislocation. Additionally, it may include what is often referred to as a “last-look”
feature1 (see, e.g. Bank of England, 2011) where the LP makes a trade acceptance decision based on pre-set criteria
in light of its assessment of the market price at the moment of trade acceptance. The last-look feature can include
taking a brief period of time – often referred to as a latency buffer – to update information sources and enable accu-
rate decision making. In a globally fragmented market, and with information disseminating from a variety of venues
each with bespoke publication protocols, the transmission and update times involved in gathering the required in-
formation necessitates the existence of this last-look feature, and, for certain traders including those with highly
aggregated execution setups, an added latency buffer. The last-look trade acceptance decision is incorporated into
the model setup via the specification of a tolerance level to price movements over the latency buffer that are adverse
to the LP which, when exceeded, results in the rejection of a trader’s deal request.
What determines execution costs in the above setup? Suppose there is only one LP in the aggregator. The trader
pays the nominal (half-) spread on execution which the LP can fully retain as revenues because the flow is unin-
formed. With two or more LPs in the aggregator, this logic breaks down: when the LP wins a deal request he must
have shown a better price than any of its competitors but with uncertainty of where the true price is, chances are
that he mis-priced the deal. The mere act of aggregation induces adverse selection where the LP that secures the
deal suffers from the “Winner’s curse” (Thaler, 1988). The trader will observe tighter or even negative spreads in
the aggregator while the LP will find that the post-deal price movement is more likely to go in the trader’s favour
than in his. To defend against this, the LP can enforce the last-look trade acceptance criteria and adjust its tolerance
to adverse selection. I show that it is this interplay that determines transaction costs, i.e. the number of liquidity
providers, the nominal spread, and the trade acceptance criteria translate into an effective spread which represents
the true cost of execution in an aggregator.
This paper presents extensive results on the key metrics that characterise the properties of aggregation. For an
arbitrary number of LPs with identical liquidity dynamics and trade acceptance criteria, I derive closed form ex-
pressions for the observed spread in the aggregator, the reject rate due to last-look, and the effective spread as a
representative measure of actual transaction costs incurred by the trader taking into account the slippage result-
1In independent and concurrent work, Cartea and Jaimungal (2015) study how venue specific last look requirements influence the choice
of where latency arbitrageurs operate.
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ing from execution uncertainty. Next, I introduce heterogeneity of LPs by allowing each to have distinct dynamics,
nominal spreads, and trade acceptance settings. This allows for an analysis of relative market share and gross rev-
enues, along with effective spread and reject rate, which now vary across LPs. Finally, I investigate the impact of
differences in the speed of price discovery across LPs and how that can be mitigated by use of the latency buffer.
How should the trader execute in the aggregator once its setup has been defined? For small amounts, she can
simply trade on best price. For larger amounts, there may not be sufficient liquidity available at the inside spread
and so she faces a choice: either aggress through the stack of bids or offers and simultaneously deal with multiple
LPs for the combined amount required (i.e. “stack-sweep” execution) or trade with a single LP that offers her the
best price in the full amount (i.e. “full-amount” execution). The usual argument for using stack-sweep is that each
child-order is of smaller size and will therefore cross a tighter spread than what is charged for a single full amount
order size. But this assumes of course that the LPs offer the same liquidity to a trader irrespective of execution
style. To study this, I formulate a model where the LPs decide to either internalise trades by holding the risk until
they find opposing interest from other traders, or to externalise trades by immediate one-for-one hedging on public
venues thereby creating an instantaneous market impact that is proportional to the volume executed. Some LPs are
quicker in accessing the market than others. All LPs aim to minimise cost of trading. In this setup, I characterise
the equilibrium hedging strategies of the LPs and show that with stack execution, a single LP that has quick market
access and for whom it is relatively expensive to internalise risk, can effectively force all other LPs to externalise the
trader’s flow thereby maximising the market impact and aggregate costs levied onto the LPs. The LPs are locked in
a “Prisoner’s dilemma” type equilibrium. This is unlikely to benefit the trader’s effective spread. In fact, it is hard to
imagine any scenario where a trader with uninformed flow will achieve lower trading costs with LPs that externalise
than with those that internalise. The results here highlight the fragility of the aggregator setup in this regard, where
the addition of a single new LP into an established well-functioning setup, can change the hedging behaviour of all
participating LPs and radically increase execution costs for the trader.
The central message of the paper is then that execution costs associated with trading in an aggregator are not
simply controlled by the nominal spreads the LPs charge or the inside spread observed in the aggregator, but are
instead determined by a combination of factors including (i) the number of LPs participating in the aggregator, (ii)
the type of LPs selected, (iii) the trader’s execution style, (iv) the nominal spread charged by each LP, (v) the LPs’
trade acceptance criteria as well as (vi) intrinsic characteristics of the LPs such as the quality of price discovery and
(vii) market volatility. In practice, the first 5 factors are choice variables that can be negotiated between the trader
and the LPs: the primary initiative on the first three generally sits with the trader whereas iv & v are then set by the
LPs aiming to satisfy spread or fill-ratio requirements of the trader subject to commercial viability. The effective
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spread measure proposed in the paper is a quantity that is representative of the all-in execution costs. For a given
set of trades and the LP’s post-deal price stream it is trivial to calculate it in practice, both for the trader and for the
LP, as the required information is common to them (and only to them). Careful trade cost analysis and an open and
informed dialogue between the trader and LPs on the nature of the liquidity provision and aggregator configuration
is thus of fundamental importance.
The applicability of this paper is not restricted to the spot currency market. Aggregation of one form or another
is taking an increasingly prominent role across a number of over-the-counter markets. For example, the Dodd-
Frank act mandates that trading of vanilla interest rate and credit default swaps now takes place on Swap Execution
Facilities where a minimum of three LPs are required to compete for a trader’s flow (see Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 2013). Traders in the US Treasury and corporate bond markets adopt a similar approach where they
request quotes from multiple LPs when they require liquidity. The contract formation process and execution style
may vary across these markets but the basic mechanisms discussed in this paper still apply.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formulates the model which is then used to obtain
the results for an arbitrary number of homogenous LPs in Section 3 and two heterogenous LPs in Section 4. The
analysis of trader execution style and equilibrium hedging strategies is presented in Section 5. The appendices
contain the proofs and some additional results.
2 Themodel setup
Let the unobserved true (logarithmic) price process of a specified security follow a random walk, i.e.
p ∗t = p ∗t−1 + "t , (1)
with " ∼ i.i.d. N (0,σ2). There are N competing liquidity providers (LPs) that offer liquidity in the security to a
known counterpart or trader on a bi-lateral basis, i.e. they each post a bid-price (b ) and an ask-price (a ) at which
they are willing to buy and sell a standard amount, at a spread s = a −b centred around a mid-price p . I assume the
dynamics of the observed bid- and ask-prices for LP-i , i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N ], to be as follows:
b (i )t = p
(i )
t − si2 and a
(i )
t = p
(i )
t +
si
2
, (2)
where
p (i )t = p
∗
t +m
(i )
t , (3)
m (i )t = βi m
(i )
t−1 +η
(i )
t , (4)
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Figure 1: Aggregated liquidity dynamics
Panel A : sample price paths Panel B : spread in the aggregator
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Note. Panel A draws sample price paths of bids (b ) and offers (a ) of two (N = 2) competing liquidity providers together with the unobserved
“true” price (p ∗). Parameters are equal for both LPs and set as s = 1,σ = 0.5,ω = 0.35,β = 0.9,ρ = 0.5. Panel B draws the inside spread
observed in the aggregator decomposed into (unobservable) ask spread a −p ∗ and bid spread p ∗− b .
withη(i ) ∼ i.i.d.N (0, (1−β2i )ω2i ), 0≤β < 1, and corr(η(i )t ,η( j )t ) =ρi , j for i 6= j . The process m – also referred to below
as p ∗-deviation – allows for a dual interpretation. The LP may set the mid-price p equal to its best but imperfect
estimate of the unobserved true price p ∗. In this case m represents the measurement error of the estimator. Alter-
natively, one may assume the measurement error is negligible and m instead reflects a price “skew” that the LP uses
to indicate its relative willingness to buy or sell the security. As part of an inventory risk management strategy, the
LP may skew down its mid-price (m < 0) to discourage further sell orders and actively solicit buy orders to reduce its
long position, and vice versa. Whilst the LPs independently construct their mid-prices, in practice the information
sets they use for the purposes of price discovery may be partially overlapping and this can lead to cross-sectional
correlation in their measurement errors. Similarly, the set of counterparts the LPs provide liquidity to may be fully
or partially overlapping, and this can lead to cross-sectional correlation in positions and thus in price skews. The
parameter ρ captures this effect.
The trader’s liquidity demand is assumed to be exogenously motivated, and independent of the future evolution
of the price process, i.e. a “noise” trader in Kyle (1985) terminology. She uses an aggregator to consolidate the
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liquidity provided by the LPs and deals in standard amounts on the best available price. That is, she submits an
offer to buy at price a t = mini a
(i )
t which the aggregator will route to LP i t = arg mini a
(i )
t , and she submits an offer to
sell at price b t = maxi b
(i )
t which the aggregator will route to LP i t = arg maxi b
(i )
t . As discussed in the introduction,
the liquidity provided to the trader is indicative in nature and depending on the circumstances a trader’s request
to deal may be accepted or rejected by the LP: she is not guaranteed to transact at b t or a t . From a transaction
cost analysis perspective, it is thus important to distinguish between the observed inside spread in the aggregator
(i.e. a t −b t ) and the effective spread that incorporates any slippage costs introduced by the execution uncertainty.
These quantities will be studied in detail below.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the model setup.2 Panel A draws a simulated sample path of two LPs’ bid-
and ask-prices around the unobserved true price, based on the model defined by Eqs. (1 – 4) . It highlights the
alternating nature of the LP that has the best available price at any point in time. Panel B shows the time-varying
dynamics of the inside spread decomposed into its bid and ask components.
The usual setup for a model of market making in the microstructure literature is one where a dealer faces a
crowd of anonymous traders and either sets a single price or spread for all based on inventory considerations and
the need to be compensated for absorbing risk or based on information considerations and the need to balance the
costs of dealing with informed traders with the revenues made from uninformed traders (see, e.g. O’Hara, 1995, for
an overview). The model presented here differs in a number of important ways, namely it focusses on the bi-lateral
interactions between a single trader and the LPs competing for its flow, the relationship between trader and LP is
disclosed, and this in turn allows the LP to provide liquidity and set prices that are bespoke to the trader. The setup
is consistent with an over-the-counter market structure as opposed to anonymous exchange-based trading. And
while the model in Eqs. (1 – 4) is of reduced form, it is not incompatible with the basic premise of information-
and inventory-based models. For instance, despite the trader being uninformed, I will show below that important
information effects arise: when the LP wins an offer to transact from the trader it knows that at that point its price
was more aggressive than any of the other LPs competing in the aggregator and this information can be used by the
2The illustrations throughout the paper require a choice of specific model parameter values. Because statistical inference is beyond the
scope of this paper, I normalise onσ and setω≈σ on the basis that the high-frequency data literature estimates the so-called “noise ratio”,
i.e. ω/σ in the setup here, to be around 0.5 for a range of liquid currencies and US equities(see, e.g., Christensen, Oomen, and Podolskij,
2014, Table 3). In standard market microstructure models, the spread s typically compensates the market maker for providing immediacy in
a risky asset (with risk measured byσ) and/or to protect against adverse selection due to information asymmetry or mis-pricing (magnitude
of this is measured byω). It therefore seems reasonable to set the spread to a (small) multiple of theσ orω. For the parametersβ andρ there
is little guidance available so I set them to ad hoc values: ρ = 0.5 in a range (0.5, 0.75) and β in a range (0.5, 0.9) depending on the specific
illustration.
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LP to refine its estimate of the unobserved efficient price process. While this feedback mechanism is not explicitly
modelled here, the mean-reverting nature of the m-process captures such dynamics. Similarly, when the market
maker acquires a large position from traders’ directional flow, inventory considerations would lead it to adjust prices
in an attempt the balance the flow and reduce the position. Again, this is consistent with a mean-reverting process
for m and the price skewing interpretation outlined above.
3 Homogenous liquidity providers
I start by analysing the case of N ≥ 1 competing LPs with identical dynamics, i.e. ωi =ω,βi = β , si = s and ρi , j =ρ
for all i 6= j . I derive properties of the observed spread and show that despite the uninformed nature of the trader’s
flow, strong adverse selection can be introduced by the act of aggregation. Using a simple rule to characterise the
trade acceptance decision of the LP, I study the probability of a trader’s deal request getting rejected and the factors
that make this more or less likely. I then provide a characterisation of the effective spread: a representative measure
of actual transaction costs incurred by the trader that incorporates any slippage costs associated with the execution
uncertainty that the trade acceptance process introduces. Section 4 studies the same topics for heterogenous LPs
with distinct liquidity dynamics and trade acceptance criteria.
3.1 Observed spread and adverse selection in an aggregator
Proposition 1 For a panel of N homogenous liquidity providers, the expected observed spread in an aggregator is
S ≡ E (a t − b t ) = s −2ω
p
1−ρψN , (5)
whereψN = E (maxi {ui }Ni=1) for ui ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1). Note thatψ1 = 0,ψ2 = 1/ppi,ψ3 = 3/p4pi, andψN ∝
p
log N for
large N .
Proof See Appendix B. 
This result characterises a number of important properties of S . First, the observed spread decreases with an in-
crease in ω (i.e. ∂ S/∂ ω < 0) or a decrease in ρ (i.e. ∂ S/∂ ρ > 0). Intuitively, ω and ρ control the variability of the
LPs prices relative to the common true price and relative to each other respectively. With increased variability or
disagreements across the LPs prices, the higher the best bid and the lower the best ask will be and thus the tighter
the observed spread. Note that when ω = 0 or ρ = 1 the effective number of LPs is one (they all quote identical
prices) and S = s . Second, the observed spread decreases with an increase in the number of liquidity providers N
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Figure 2: Observed spread and adverse selection in an aggregator
Panel A : observed inside spread Panel B : valuation of a trade
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Note. Panel A draws the expected observed spread S as a function of the number of competing liquidity providers, N . For the baseline
scenario the model parameters are set to s = 1,σ = 0.5,ω= 0.4,β = 0.8,ρ = 0.5. This is varied to ρ = 0.75 for the higher correlation scenario
and toω= 0.5 for the higher dispersion scenario. Panel B draws the marked-to-mid valuation of a trade Vh (solid lines for h ≥ 0) as in Eq. (7)
for different number of liquidity providers N using the baseline parameters as in Panel A. The pre-deal behaviour (solid lines for h < 0) and
the long-term valuation V∞ (dashed lines) are superimposed.
(i.e. ∂ S/∂ N < 0, unless ω = 0 and / or ρ = 0 in which case ∂ S/∂ N = 0). With every addition of a new LP the best
bid and ask can – ceteris paribus – only be improved and never worsened. However, because ∂ 2S/∂ N 2 > 0, the
rate at which the spread contracts as new LPs are added decreases with N . Third, while the observed spread in the
aggregator can never exceed the nominal spread s , there is nothing that prevents it from turning negative. In fact,
for sufficiently largeω or N the expected observed spread can be arbitrarily negative. Note that a negative spread
implies that the bid of at least one LP must exceed the ask of another and that this would present a guaranteed arbi-
trage opportunity were it not for the indicative nature of the liquidity and the associated trade acceptance process
discussed below. Finally, the observed spread is invariant to the speed of mean reversion β (this is simply because
the unconditional variance of m is assumed to be independent of β ) and the efficient price volatilityσ (it is devia-
tions from the true price that affect the observed spread rather than the variability of the true price itself). Panel A
of Figure 2 provides an illustration.
Additional insights into the properties of aggregation can be obtained by considering the value of a trade to the
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liquidity provider (for the moment I assume that every deal request is accepted). At trade inception, the LP earns
half the spread whilst the long-term expected valuation of the trade is established by adding any systematic (adverse
or favourable) price movements. Specifically, the LP’s valuation of a trade h periods after the point of execution is:
Vh ≡ E
 s
2
+ (p (i )t +h −p (i )t ) | b (i )t > b (6=i )t

= E
 s
2
− (p (i )t +h −p (i )t ) | a (i )t < a (6=i )t

for h ≥ 0. (6)
Naively, one may expect due to the uninformedness of the trader’s flow there to be no systematic price impacts
post-deal and the value of a trade to equal half the spread charged. But this reasoning overlooks that to win the deal
request in the first place, the LP needs to show a more attractive price than any of its competitors. With uncertainty
of where the true price is, the LP that wins the trader’s deal request to sell (buy) is likely the one that over- (under-)
estimates the true value. This is the so-called Winner’s curse (see Thaler, 1988). A type of adverse selection that
was first discussed in the literature in the context of bidding in common value auctions (see, e.g., Capen, Clapp,
and Campbell, 1971; Kagel and Levin, 1986) and to which the aggregator setup here bears a close resemblance. The
below result formalises this intuition.
Proposition 2 For a panel of N homogenous liquidity providers competing for a trader’s uninformed flow, the LP’s
expected valuation of a trade marked-to-mid h periods post deal is:
Vh =
s
2
− (1−βh )ωp1−ρψN for h ≥ 0, (7)
whereψN is as defined in Proposition 1.
Proof See Appendix B. 
When N = 1 the spread capture at deal inception is fully retained (i.e. Vh = s/2 for all h > 0): because there is no
competition, the Winner’s curse does not apply. When N > 1, adverse selection is introduced merely through the act
of aggregation and this results in an erosion of initial spread capture and a valuation of Vh < s/2. Logic dictates that
the effective half-spread the trader pays should equal the LP’s long-term valuation of a trade. The effective spread,
denoted by S, can therefore be defined as:
S≡ 2 lim
h→∞Vh = s −2ω
p
1−ρψN . (8)
Because every deal request is accepted by the LP, the observed spread equals the effective spread and its properties
carry over one-for-one: the degree of adverse selection the LP is exposed to upon winning a deal request increases
with an increase inω and N and a decrease in ρ. The speed at which the LP’s valuation converges to the effective
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spread is determined byβ . Panel B of Figure 2 provides an illustration. It emphasises the key point that even though
the trader’s flow is random and uninformed, each and every liquidity provider competing in the aggregator will
perceive the flow as informed in that post-deal they will observe a systematic move in their mid-price p that favours
the trader and is adverse to the LP.3
3.2 “Last look” trade acceptance
With adverse selection induced by aggregation, it is easy to arrive at a point where the effective spread paid by
the trader is not commercially viable anymore for the LPs. At this point, one can proceed along a few different
avenues. Firstly, individual LPs may decide to terminate their relationship with the trader by withdrawing liquidity
provision. This leads to a reduction in N and, ceteris paribus, an increase in effective spread which may be sufficient
to regain commercial viability for the remaining LPs. Secondly, the LPs may decide to widen the nominal spread they
charge to a point where liquidity provision can be resumed on a sustained basis. The impact of both these options
is quantified above, but neither may be desirable in practice. The LP may be reluctant to terminate its relationship
especially when the liquidity provision is only one component of the overall service it provides to the trader, and
equally the trader may require a certain number of LPs in her aggregator for redundancy purposes or to satisfy
internal execution guidelines. Widening the spread by a single LP will lead to reduced market share and a likely
increase in adverse selection which taken together may reduce the revenues for this LP (Section 4 studies this in
more detail). A uniform widening of the spread across LPs would avoid this situation but the coordination required
to achieve this is incompatible with the competitive nature of the market and the independent decision making by
LPs. A third option exists to control the adverse selection and effective spread, and that is for the LPs to enforce trade
acceptance criteria. To study this mechanism, I specify a simple rule where a trader’s request to sell, submitted at
time t , will be accepted by the LP at time t +n if
b (i )t +n − b (i )t >−δ for n ≥ 1,δ≥ 0, (9)
and rejected otherwise. Analogously, the LP will accept a trader’s request to buy if a (i )t +n−a (i )t <δ and reject otherwise
(in Oomen, 2016, I study a number of alternative last look specifications). The parameter n specifies the number of
periods the LP takes to make a trade acceptance decision. In the spirit of the NIPS code (Bank of England, 2011), I
refer to this as a “latency buffer”. In a globally fragmented market, and with information disseminating from a variety
3As an aside, note that the chart also includes the pre-deal mid-price evolution (adjusted for trade direction) which shows an increasing
aggression of the price in the run-up to winning a deal request. This pattern is specific to the setup here, and will look very different if for
instance the trader’s buy or sell decisions are triggered by the (true) price reaching specific levels, e.g. stop-loss or take-profit orders.
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Figure 3: Trade acceptance and adverse selection in an aggregator
Panel A : reject rate for varying n and δ Panel B : distribution of price move over latency buffer n
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Note. Panel A draws the probability of a reject R as a function of tolerance level δ for varying latency buffer horizons n . The solid lines are
based on numerical simulations, whereas the markers (×) indicate the analytical approximation given in Eq. (11). Panel B draws the price
distribution over the latency buffer n = 1 with the shaded areas highlighting the range where deal requests are accepted or rejected for δ= s .
In both panels, the model parameters are set as s = 1,σ= 0.5,ω= 0.4,β = 0.5,ρ = 0.5, N = 10.
of venues each with bespoke publication protocols, it takes time to gather all the relevant information required for
accurate price discovery and to make an informed trade acceptance decision and this is precisely what the latency
buffer provides (in practice, it is typically set to a fraction of a second). The parameter δ represents the maximum
adverse price movement over the latency buffer that the LP is willing to tolerate short of rejecting the trade request.
For instance, with δ = s/2 the LP will reject the request to deal only if more than the full half-spread is lost to an
adverse price movement within the latency buffer. Also note that negative values of δ are not permissible in the
current model setup, i.e. I enforce that the LP will accept the deal request when the price doesn’t move over the
latency buffer.
The key quantity of interest in this discussion is of course the probability of a deal request getting rejected, i.e.
R≡ Pr(b (i )t +n − b (i )t <−δ | b (i )t > b (6=i )t ) = Pr(a (i )t +n −a (i )t >δ | a (i )t < a (6=i )t ). (10)
Proposition 3 For a panel of N homogenous liquidity providers competing for a trader’s uninformed flow, and a trade
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acceptance rule as defined by Eq. (9), the probability of a deal request getting rejected is approximately:
R≈Φ

(1−βn )ωp1−ρψN −δp
nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2

, (11)
where Φ(·) denotes the distribution of a standard normal random variable.
Proof See Appendix B. 
This result characterises the key properties of the reject rate in an aggregator setup with last-look trade acceptance.
As expected, an increase in tolerance level δ lowers the reject rate (i.e. ∂ R/∂ δ < 0) and drives it down to zero as
δ→∞. Note that whenδ= 0 the reject rate is at its highest and will always exceed 50%: this is a direct consequence
of the adverse selection induced by aggregation that makes price moves in the trader’s favour more likely than those
in the LP’s favour (provided that N > 1,ω> 0,ρ < 1). An increase in the latency buffer n increases the reject rate (i.e.
∂ R/∂ n > 0). Two re-inforcing effects are at play here, namely (i) due to mean-reversion in m the adverse selection
builds up over time (i.e. the second term in Eq. 7) so that with larger n the LP is better able to identify the effect and
(ii) the natural variation of the efficient price process grows linearly over time and so a longer latency buffer makes it
more likely for the price to exceed the tolerance level. Similarly, anything that elevates the variability or dispersion of
LPs’ prices leads to an increase in reject rate, i.e. ∂ R/∂ σ > 0, ∂ R/∂ N > 0, ∂ R/∂ ω> 0, and ∂ R/∂ ρ < 0. With higher
N ,ω or lower ρ the adverse selection effect grows and this in turn heightens the chances of a price move to exceed
the set tolerance level and generate a reject. Note that the same impact is observed with increases in the efficient
price volatilityσ. This is a somewhat undesirable yet unavoidable property of the last-look mechanism, as modelled
here, in that efficient price moves are unrelated to the trader’s actions or the Winner’s curse and should therefore not
affect the reject rate. But because p ∗ is unobservable, efficient price moves are indistinguishable and inseparable
from adverse selection effects.4 Finally, consider the impact of β on the reject rate. With a more persistent and
less erratic measurement error, the price discovery is essentially slower and the ability of the LP to identify adverse
selection is reduced, hence ∂ R/∂ β < 0. Likewise, with more persistent position skewing, the LP’s prices are less
volatile, reducing the probability of them exceeding the threshold.
Figure 3 further illustrates some of these points. Panel A draws the reject rates as a function of the tolerance level
δ and for different values of the buffer n . It shows that the approximation in Eq. (11) is very accurate in a wide range
of the parameter space. The shaded area highlights the impermissible range of negative tolerance levels where the
4In practice one may find the sensitivity of the reject rate to changes in σ to be limited because (i) empirically σ and s tend to move in
tandem and (ii) whilst ∂ R/∂ s = 0 in the model here, a larger s does affords the LP with more room to loosen the tolerance levelδ. Alternatively,
it is of course possible to specify a trade acceptance rule where δ is an increasing function ofσ or s .
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reject rate continues to go up and eventually converges to 100%. Panel B draws the post-deal price distribution over
the latency buffer to illustrate the adverse selection effect, i.e. price moves in favour of the trader are more likely
than those in favour of the LP. There are three distinct regions, namely (i) the price moves in the LP’s favour and the
deal request is accepted (green area), (ii) the price moves against the LP but within the defined tolerance levelδ and
the deal request is accepted (blue area), and (iii) the price moves against the LP by more than δ and the deal request
is rejected (red area).
How does the last-look mechanism impact the effective spread paid by the trader? Starting with the valuation
of a trade, as before, the LP stands to earn the nominal half-spread at trade inception and its long-term valuation
is obtained by adding any systematic post-deal price movements. The difference here is that instead of needing to
only condition on winning the deal request, we now also need to condition on the request to successfully pass the
trade acceptance rule in Eq. (9), i.e.
Vh = E
 s
2
+ (p (i )t +h −p (i )t ) | b (i )t > b (6=i )t , b (i )t +n > b (i )t −δ

= E
 s
2
− (p (i )t +h −p (i )t ) | a (i )t < a (6=i )t , a (i )t +n < a (i )t +δ

. (12)
Following the same logic as above, the effective spread is defined as S= 2V∞.
Proposition 4 For a panel of N homogenous liquidity providers competing for a trader’s uninformed flow, and a trade
acceptance rule as defined by Eq. (9), a lower bound for the effective spread is:
S> s −2ωp1−ρψN +2 nσ2nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2 G ((1−βn )ωp1−ρψN −δ, nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2). (13)
where G (µx ,σ2x ) = σxφ(µx /σx )/(1−Φ(µx /σx )), and φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the density and distribution of a standard
normal random variable.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Eq. (13) shows that the effective spread can be decomposed into three separable and intuitive components, namely
the nominal spread (+), the gross adverse selection costs (-), plus any recovered adverse selection costs via the
trade acceptance rule (+). With similar intuition to the discussion of the reject rate, the effective spread increases
with an increase in the latency buffer n (more protection for the LP), cross-sectional correlation of p ∗-deviations
ρ (less diversity amongst LPs), efficient price volatility σ (more likely to breach trade acceptance threshold), and
of course the nominal spread s . The effective spread also increases with a decrease in the tolerance level δ (more
protection for the LP), number of liquidity providers N (less competition amongst LPs), magnitude of p ∗-deviations
ω (more accurate pricing), and persistence of p ∗-deviations β (quicker reversion to true price). It is worth noting
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Figure 4: Trade valuation and effective spread with last-look trade acceptance
Panel A : trade valuation and effective spread Panel B : indifference curves for effective spread
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Note. Panel A draws the marked-to-mid valuations Vh of accepted and rejected deal requests, together with the effective half-spread ap-
proximation given by Eq. (13). The model parameters are set as s = 1,σ = 0.5,ω = 0.35,β = 0.75,ρ = 0.5, N = 25, n = 1,δ = s/2. Pre-deal
dynamics are added to the chart for h < 0. Panel B draws a few indifference curves where the same effective spread is attained by different
combinations of number of liquidity providers N (x-axis) and the accept rate 1−R controlled by δ (y-axis). The grey area marks the region
where the trade acceptance tolerance level δ is set to impermissible (negative) values.
that while the observed spread in the aggregator is invariant to the efficient price volatilityσ, or the persistence of the
measurement error β , the effective spread is impacted by these parameters : in turbulent markets characterised by
elevated market volatility or erratic measurement error /price skews the effective spread paid by the trader increases
despite her crossing the same spread in the aggregator.
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the trade valuation and effective spread with last-look. In the example of Panel
A, the effective spread is composed of a nominal spread of s = 1 minus an adverse selection component of 0.97 plus
recovered adverse selection costs via the trade acceptance process of 0.38 resulting in an effective half-spread of 0.20
(the crosses in the chart). Panel B draws indifference curves where the same effective spread is attained by different
combinations of the number of LPs N and the accept rate 1−R as controlled by δ. For instance, an effective spread
of S= 0.7 can be achieved – in this example – with three LPs accepting about 95% of the deal requests or with twenty
LPs accepting about 60% of deal requests (note that the observed spread in the aggregator is 0.581 with three LPs and
0.076, or about a tenth of the effective spread, with twenty LPs). This underlines a fundamental point: for a trader
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to fully understand the transaction costs associated with trading in a defined aggregator setup (i.e. N ,ω,β ,ρ andσ
are fixed) she can’t merely look at the nominal spread the LPs charge, or the observed spread that she crosses in the
aggregator, but she needs to consider the triplet of choice variables (s , n ,δ) and the effective spread that translates
into.
To conclude the discussion, consider a trading setup without last-look. The equity market provides a good exam-
ple, where so-called smart-order-routers (SORs) are routinely used to aggregate fragmented exchange liquidity and
subsequently make decisions on where to route orders. A trader using an SOR to access this firm non-last-look ex-
change liquidity, however, still faces execution risk simply because of the physical distances and information trans-
mission times between the competing venues and the trader location. For instance, by the time the SOR presents
the trader with the latest liquidity available from a particular venue – or later still, by the time a resulting trader’s
order arrives at the venue attempting to access that liquidity – the price may have changed, the quote cancelled, or
the liquidity removed by another trader.5 The further the trader is located from the trading venues, or the greater
the geographic dispersion of venues, the higher the execution risk will be. Co-location doesn’t eliminate the issue
either, because it can only get the trader close to one (or a few) venue but not all, and moreover, she will still need
to compete with other traders in that same co-location. This last point highlights a key distinction between public
exchange liquidity and the OTC liquidity: the former is available on a first-come-first-serve basis whereas the lat-
ter is typically available to many traders simultaneously and the liquidity demand of one trader doesn’t necessarily
impact the liquidity available to another trader.
4 Heterogenous liquidity providers
Up to now, the LPs each produce distinct prices but the processes that govern their liquidity dynamics and their
trade acceptance settings are assumed to be identical. As a result, all LPs are exposed to the same degree of adverse
selection, are equally likely to be top-of-book in the aggregator and to win a trader’s request to deal, have the same
market share, and each earn the same revenues. In this section I will study the properties of execution in an aggre-
gator when the participating LPs have different characteristics. The case where N = 2 provides the key insights and
retains analytic tractability so I’ll limit the discussion to this.
5For example, see http://www.iextrading.com/insight/stats/, for monthly statistics on the fill ratios of the IEX SOR.
For July 2015, it ranges from 69% for orders routed to CHI-X, to 88% for NYSE, to 99% for BATS.
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4.1 Differences in liquidity characteristics and trade acceptance criteria
Proposition 5 Consider two heterogenous liquidity providers competing for a trader’s uninformed flow, and a trade
acceptance rule as defined by Eq. (9). The expected observed spread in the aggregator is:
S = s2− (s2− s1)Φ

s2− s1
2σ∆m

−2σ∆mφ

s2− s1
2σ∆m

, (14)
where σ2∆m =ω
2
1 +ω
2
2−2ρmω1ω2, and ρm =ρ
Æ
(1−β21 )(1−β22 )/(1−β1β2). The probability of LP-i having the best
price and winning a request to deal is:
Ti = Pr(b (i )t > b
(6=i )
t ) = Pr(a
(i )
t < a
(6=i )
t ) =Φ
 s6=i − si
2σ∆m

. (15)
The probability of a deal request getting rejected by LP-i is approximately:
Ri ≈Φ
 (1−βnii )ω2i −ρmω6=iωiσ2∆m G ( 12 (si − s6=i ),σ2∆m )−δiÇ
niσ2 + (1−β2nii )ω2i
 . (16)
A lower bound for the effective spread charged by LP-i is:
Si > si −2ω
2
i −ρmω6=iωi
σ2∆m
G

1
2
(si − s6=i ),σ2∆m

,
+2
niσ
2
niσ2 + (1−β2nii )ω2i
G

(1−βnii )
ω2i −ρmω6=iωi
σ2∆m
G (
1
2
(si − s6=i ),σ2∆m )−δi , niσ2 + (1−β2nii )ω2i

. (17)
Proof See Appendix B. 
There are a few additional execution metrics that can be derived from the above: the expected market share of LP-i ,
Mi =Ti (1−Ri )/∑ j T j (1−R j ), the expected gross revenues of LP-i ,Wi = 12SiMi , and the effective spread the trader
pays for execution within the aggregator, ST =
∑
i MiSi .
Differences in nominal spread To start, consider the scenario where both LPs have identical liquidity dynamics
and trade acceptance settings except that LP-2 charges a different nominal spread to LP-1, i.e. s1 6= s2 with all other
parameters equal. In this case, the observed spread S is bounded by min(s1, s2) and the probability for LP-i to have
the best price in the aggregator, Ti , diminishes the wider the spread is in relation to that of its competitor. Turning
to Ri , note that the LP that widens its nominal spread will – ceteris paribus – reject a larger fraction of the deal
requests but it also leads to a decrease in the reject rate of its competitor (Figure 5, Panel A). With a wider spread,
the p ∗-deviation needs to be stronger for the LP to win deal requests, but in those instances the adverse selection
will also be stronger making it more likely for the LP to reject the deal request. The reject rate for the other LP
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Table 1: Execution metrics with heterogenous liquidity providers
observed effective reject market gross
Two otherwise identical LPs spread spread rate share revenues
with LP-2 incrementally . . . S S1 S2 ST R1 R2 M1 M2 W1 W2
wider nominal spread (s ) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓↑
more volatile p ∗-deviations (ω) ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
more persistent p ∗-deviations (β ) = = ↓ ↓ = ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
more generous tolerance (δ) = = ↓ ↓ = ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓
longer latency buffer (n) = = ↑ ↑ = ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
Note. For two identical LPs, this table reports how the various execution metrics change when LP-2 marginally increases one of the
parameters governing the liquidity dynamics or trade acceptance process, e.g. for the impact of a widening of s2 on effective spread for
LP-2, the table reports the sign of ∂ S1/∂ s2 | s2=s1 .
decreases because the diminishing competition for flow reduces the adverse selection. Next, the LP that widens its
nominal spread, will increase its effective spread St but also raise the effective spread of its competitor (Figure 5,
Panel B). Intuitively, the LP that leaves its spread unchanged will face less competition and receive deal requests
on less aggressive prices, thereby increasing its effective spread. As expected, the market share decreases with a
widening of the spread (Figure 5, Panel C) but note from the example that when s2 = 0 (and s1 = 1) the market share
of LP-2 is still not 100%: on very strong p ∗-deviation, LP-1 can still win deal requests despite the choice pricing of
LP-2.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect here is that in a region of the parameter space, the LP that widens its spread
will see its gross revenues Wi fall whilst its competitor will enjoy higher revenues (Figure 5, Panel C): a widening of
nominal spread increases the effective spread, but this can be more than offset by a drop in market share leading
to lower overall revenues. Correspondingly, in this situation, the LP can raise its revenues by tightening its nominal
spread and undercutting its competitor. There is a limit to this: at some point, with further tightening, the reduction
in effective spread is no longer compensated by larger gains in market share and the gross revenues will drop. In the
limit, when s2 = 0 (and s1 = 1), LP-1’s revenues dominate those of LP-2 although the latter are still positive because
of the last-look mechanism.
The above discussion naturally leads to the question whether there is an equilibrium spread the LPs would
charge. In an iterative process where conditional on the spread of one LP the other will set its spread to maximise
gross revenues, will the spread converge, and if so to what value? This is a hard question to answer analytically, but
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Figure 5: Execution metrics with two liquidity providers charging a different nominal spread
Panel A : reject probability R vs s2 Panel B : effective spread S vs s2
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Panel C : market shareM vs s2 Panel D : gross revenuesW vs s2
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Note. This figure draws the effective spread (Panel A), reject rate (Panel B), market share (Panel C), and gross revenues (Panel D) as a function
of LP-2 nominal spread s2 with s1 = 1,σ= 0.5,ω1 =ω2 = 0.25,β1 =β2 = 0.75,ρ = 0.5, N = 2, n1 = n2 = 1,δ1 =δ2 = s/2. The solid lines are based
on simulations whereas the markers (×) are, or follow directly from, the analytical approximations given in Proposition 5.
using the expressions in Proposition 5 it is easy to consider a numerical example, see Figure 6. Panel A shows the
nominal spread the LPs set in every round when the starting point is s1 = s2 = 1. The spread converges to s1 = s2 ≈ 0.3
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and Panel B shows that an equilibrium is attained because neither LP can increase its revenues by changing spreads.
What happens if, for instance, the trade acceptance criteria differ between LPs? Panel C considers the case where
n1 = 1 and n2 = 2: LP-2 imposes more stringent criteria than LP-1. Again the spreads converge, but now to different
values, i.e. s1 → 0.25 and s2 → 0.09. Note from Panel D that while s2 is less than half s1 in steady state, the gross
revenues that LP-2 earns are more than double those of LP-1 : the tighter spread earns LP-2 a larger market share
while the stricter trade acceptance settings aid spread retention, resulting in higher revenues.
Differences inpricedynamicsand tradeacceptance settings Table 1 summarises the trading metric properties by
considering the impact of an incremental change in one of the liquidity or trade acceptance parameters, assuming
all other model parameters are identical and unchanged (see also Figure 9 in the Appendix). Consider the param-
eters governing the price dynamics. A difference inω between LPs can be interpreted as a difference in the quality
of their price discovery. With higher ω, the LP’s prices will be less accurate and more volatile, and this leads to a
compression of the effective spread, an increase in the LP’s reject rate, and a decrease in its market share and gross
revenues. The lost revenues for this LP are effectively redistributed between the trader and competitor LP in some
proportion defined by the exact model parameters: the trader will benefit from a tighter observed and effective
spread and the competitor LP will be able to accept more deals, and enjoy higher market share and gross revenues.
This emphasises that – despite the uninformedness of the trader’s flow – there is a greater importance put on the
quality of price discovery to meet the need for commercial viability when N > 1. A higher β implies more persistent
skewing, or measurement errors that die down more slowly: the unconditional variance of m (and hence the ob-
served spread S ) is unchanged due to the scaling of the variance of η in Eq. 4, but over short horizons the process is
less erratic. As a result, deal requests are less likely to be rejected as the variability of the LP’s prices over the latency
buffer is reduced. But because the adverse selection in the aggregator is of equal magnitude, with lower reject rate,
the effective spread for the LP is also reduced. The competitor LP’s reject rate and effective spread is unaffected by
the increase inβ , but because its market share drops, so do its gross revenues. Put simply, an increase inβ increases
competition in the aggregator, it leads to a higher market share for the LP with the higher β and the trader benefits
from a reduction in effective spread.
The impact of an increase in trade acceptance tolerance level δ is qualitatively equal to that of a decrease in
latency buffer n and so I will limit discussion to δ. As expected, the effective spread and reject rate are reduced for
the LP that loosens the tolerance levels whilst these metrics are unchanged for its competitor. The drop in reject
rate leads to an increase in market share at the expense of the other LP but the increased competition leads to a
reduction of revenues for both LPs. Intuitively, under-pricing of liquidity by one LP affects the viability of all other
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Figure 6: Convergence to equilibrium spreads with homogenous and heterogenous liquidity providers
Panel A : spread convergence with homogenous LPs Panel B : revenue profiles across iterations
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Panel C : spread convergence with heterogenous LPs Panel D : revenue profiles across iterations
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Note. This figure draws the spread convergence process in Panels A & C and the associated revenue profiles (i.e. Wi and W 6=i as a function
of si for fixed s 6=i ) in Panels B & D. In the top row, the LPs start the process as homogenous with s1 = s2 = 1, n1 = n2 = 1. In the bottom row, the
LPs start the process as heterogenous with s1 = s2 = 1, n1 = 1, n2 = 2. The remaining model parameters are set atσ = 0.5,ω1 =ω2 = 0.25,β1 =
β2 = 0.75,ρ = 0.5, N = 2,δ1 =δ2 = s/2.
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LPs as they will need to price more aggressively to win the deal requests.
4.2 Differences in latency or speed of price discovery
One aspect not explicitly captured by the model in Eqs. (1 – 4) is that of latency differentials. In the globally frag-
mented FX market with its numerous price sources, trading locations, and news sources, it is a substantial challenge
to obtain the relevant information on a continuous basis and in a timely fashion. Demand for fast data transmission
has led to significant investments in state-of-the-art network links between the major financial centres (or perhaps
the causality is the other way around). But in an aggregator setup, it is relative and not absolute speed that matters.
So with differences in transmission latencies and speed of price discovery amongst LPs, what can be said about its
impact on the execution metrics for both the trader and the LPs providing liquidity into the aggregator? To study
this, I make a simple modification in the model and introduce a “slow” LP that prices at a time-lag of one period
compared to a “fast” LP, i.e.
p fastt = p
∗
t +m
fast
t and p
slow
t = p
∗
t−1 +m slowt−1 . (18)
Proposition 6 Consider two liquidity providers – one fast and one slow as in Eq. (18), but otherwise identical – com-
peting for a trader’s uninformed flow, and a trade acceptance rule as defined by Eq. (9). The expected observed spread
in an aggregator is
S = s −2ωÆ1−ρβ +ω−2σ2/2ψ2. (19)
The probability of LP-fast/slow having the best price and winning a request to deal isTfast =Tslow = 12 . The probability
of a deal request getting rejected by LP-fast/slow for n > 1 is approximately:
Rfast ≈Φ
 (
1−βn )(1−ρβ)ω2q
(1−ρβ)ω2+σ2/2ψ2−δq
nσ2 +
 
1−β2n ω2
 and Rslow ≈Φ
 (1−β
n )(1−ρβ)ω2+µslowp
(1−ρβ )ω2+σ2/2 ψ2−δq
nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2−σ2slow
 . (20)
where µslow = σ2 +ρ(βn−1 − βn+1)ω2 and σ2slow = σ2 + β2n (β−2 − 1)ρ2ω2. A lower bound for the effective spread
charged by LP-fast/slow for n > 1 is:
Sfast > s −2 (1−ρβ )ω
2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2
+2
nσ2
nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2 G

(1−βn )(1−ρβ )ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2−δ, nσ
2 + (1−β2n )ω2

, (21)
Sslow > s −2 (1−ρβ )ω
2 +σ2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2
+2
(n −1)σ2
nσ2 + (1−β2n )ω2−σ2slow
G

(1−βn )(1−ρβ )ω2 +µslowp
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2 ψ2−δ, nσ
2 + (1−β2n )ω2−σ2slow

. (22)
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Figure 7: Execution metrics when speed of price discovery differs between LPs
Panel A : observed spread S vsσ and ρ Panel B : reject probability R vs δ
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Panel C : effective spread S vs δ Panel D : gross revenuesW vs δ
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Note. Panel A draws the observed spread as a function ofσ and ρ, and Panels B–D draw the reject rate, effective spread, and gross revenues
as a function of tolerance level δ. The baseline model parameters are set at s = 1,σ= 0.5,ω= 0.25,β = 0.75,ρ = 0.5, N = 2, n = 2,δ= s/2. The
solid lines are based on simulations whereas the markers (×) are, or follow directly from, the analytical approximations given in Proposition
6.
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Proof See Appendix B. 
Comparing Propositions 1 and 6 it is clear that the observed spread S is always tighter when there are latency differ-
entials between LPs than when there are not, and this effect increases with the efficient price volatility (σ) and the
persistence of p ∗-deviations (β ). LP-slow is lagging behind in price discovery and so in turbulent markets its pricing
error will increase in magnitude and any corrections take longer with higher β . In isolation this would be inconse-
quential as the trader’s flow is random, but when LP-slow is aggregated alongside LP-fast the discrepancies between
their prices is larger than it would be without latency differentials, hence the stated impact on observed spread. As
an aside, note that even when ρ = 1 and the LPs stream identical prices, the observed spread is still tighter than the
nominal spread charged by the LPs because of the time lag in LP-slow’s prices (Figure 7, Panel A). Recognising that
LP-slow essentially has less accurate and more noisy prices than LP-fast, it is intuitive that its reject rate is higher,
effective spread lower, and gross revenues suffer (Figure 7, Panels B-D).
Because the differences in trading metrics across LPs diminish as n grows, the latency buffer can be used to
mitigate the “handicap” of LP-slow (trading costs need not be affected by this as δ and/or s can be adjusted ac-
cordingly). It is this kind of observation that has motivated the deliberate introduction of artificial latencies into
numerous trading platforms (e.g. currency platforms ParFX, EBS, Reuters, and equity venue IEX) with the aim to
level the playing field and to stop the technology arms race where participants seek to exploit technological anoma-
lies of the platform to gain an advantage.
5 Full-amount versus stack-sweep execution
In the analysis above, the trader is assumed to require a standard amount of liquidity – i.e. the amount that each
LP provides individually – and it is therefore feasible that she executes with a single LP that has the best price in
the aggregator. I now consider the execution of larger amounts and focus in particular on how execution style and
hedging strategy of the participating LPs impacts on transaction costs.
For larger amounts, there are two primary execution styles that the trader can adopt. She can divide up the order
into a multiple of standard amounts and spread execution of these across as many providers at their best prices.
This is so-called “stack-sweep” execution. Alternatively, she can request all LPs to provide additional liquidity up
to the required amount and then execute the entire order with the single LP that provides the best price in the that
amount. This is typically referred to as “full-amount” execution. Which of these two strategies is best? In practice
that clearly depends on a variety of factors, including trader preferences and objective function, the agreed terms
of liquidity provision, and specific pricing at the time of execution. Another important consideration is the impact
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that execution style may have on the LPs’ hedging behaviour. I will explore this last point in some detail using a
stylised model for hedging costs, market impact, and speed-to-market.
Let ci = c Xi − c Ii denote the cost for LP-i to hedge an accepted trader’s deal request via externalisation minus
the cost of hedging via internalisation. For the purposes of this discussion, externalisation refers to the process of
instantaneously hedging the trade one-for-one in external (inter-bank or public) markets. A (relatively) low cost of
externalisation can be due to the LP’s superior technology, speed to market, access to a diversified set of liquidity
venues, smart order routing logic, and scale of trading operation for lower unit trading costs. Internalisation, on
the other hand, refers to the process of absorbing the trade into the LP’s inventory to then gradually reduce the risk
position by attracting opposing interest from the LP’s (private) client-base. Internalisation costs are driven by risk
bearing capacity, scale of franchise operation for increased risk netting opportunities, and smart risk management
logic.6
To simplify exposition, I do not explicitly link the LP’s hedging costs to the liquidity it is able to offer, although
in practice these are of course tightly coupled. Instead, I only consider the relative costs of hedging because this
is what determines their hedging strategies. Specifically, if ci > 0 then LP−i is naturally inclined to internalise and
if c j < 0 then LP- j will prefer to externalise. Note that it is possible for the LPs to have different relative costs (i.e.
ci 6= c j ) while the absolute costs of their preferred hedging strategy are the same (e.g. c Ii = c Xj ) and both can offer
equally competitive pricing to the trader.
Regarding market impact, I assume that externalisation creates an instantaneous and permanent price impact
in the direction traded of θ per unit amount. Internalisation attracts negligible impact. This is a simplification
of course: there is an extensive literature that distinguishes permanent from temporary impact, and similarly, it
is natural to expect that internalisation will – over time – incur some market impact as the LP seeks to reduce its
risk position. However, over short time scales and considering that the trader’s liquidity demand is exogenously
6The use of internalisation as a risk management methodology is highlighted in Bank of England, H.M. Treasury, and Financial Conduct
Authority (2014, p. 59): “This has led to an increase in “internalisation” in the spot FX markets where banks are able to match off client
orders internally without having to go to the inter-dealer market to hedge their risk. Market participants have indicated that some dealers
with large enough market share can now internalise up to 90% of their client orders in major currency pairs.” In contrast, an example of
a business model centred around externalisation is Virtu’s: “Our strategies are also designed to lock in returns through precise and nearly
instantaneous hedging, as we seek to eliminate the price risk in any positions held.” (see Virtu Financial, Inc, 2014, p. 2). It is important to
point out that the internalisation/externalisation classification is not simply one of bank versus non-bank LPs because there are banks that
externalise significant portions of their flow and funds that actively internalise. In practice, the hedging approach adopted by any LP will lie
somewhere along the spectrum from pure externaliser to pure internaliser, and may also vary by – for instance – market conditions and flow
characteristics.
24
Table 2: Speed-to-market in a race amongst 3 LPs
LP−1 LP−2 LP−3
1st to market
λ1
λ1 +λ2 +λ3
λ2
λ1 +λ2 +λ3
λ3
λ1 +λ2 +λ3
2nd to market
λ21(λ2 +λ3) +λ1(λ
2
2 +λ
2
3)
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ2) (λ1 +λ3)
λ22(λ1 +λ3) +λ2(λ
2
1 +λ
2
3)
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ2)
λ23(λ1 +λ2) +λ3(λ
2
1 +λ
2
2)
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ3) (λ2 +λ3)
3rd to market
λ2λ3(λ2 +λ3) +2λ1λ2λ3
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ2) (λ1 +λ3)
λ1λ3(λ1 +λ3) +2λ1λ2λ3
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ2)
λ1λ2(λ1 +λ2) +2λ1λ2λ3
(λ1 +λ2 +λ3) (λ1 +λ3) (λ2 +λ3)
Note. This table reports the probability of LP-i reaching the external market in first, second, or third place in a race amongst three com-
peting liquidity providers. The distribution of speed-to-market is given by Eq. (23).
motivated, the assumption is justifiable.7
The third and final piece of the model specifies τi : the time it takes for LP-i to access the market when it decides
to externalise. I assume this is an i.i.d. random variable with distribution:
Pr(τi <τ) = 1− e −λiτ. (23)
The expected time-to-market for LP-i is 1/λi and so the higher the λ the quicker the LP. The purpose of this com-
ponent of the model is to introduce a time-ordering amongst competing LPs when several want to externalise at
the same time, for instance in response to a stack-sweep execution. It is only the relative values of τi (and λi ) that
matter, not their absolute values (in practice, differences inτi are typically of the order of milli-seconds, if not micro-
seconds). The analysis below will require calculation of the probability that LP-i arrives to market in j t h place in
a race to externalise with N LPs. I denote this probability by P (N )i , j and Table 2 provides explicit expressions for the
case where N = 3.
5.1 Equilibrium hedging strategy
The optimal hedging strategy for full-amount execution is trivial: the LP that wins the deal request knows that it
is for the full amount and the cost-minimising strategy is to internalise if ci > 0 and externalise otherwise. The
7Externalisation – as defined here – involves instantaneous hedging. Of course it is also possible to externalise via gradual hedging in a
way that minimises market impact and makes it observationally indistinguishable from internalisation. Consequently, LPs that follow such
a strategy should be considered internalisers in the context of this paper.
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stack-sweep scenario is more interesting. To simplify exposition, I assume that N = 3 and c1 > 0, c2 > 0, c3 < 0.
This provides all the key insights and avoids any unnecessary complexity. The LPs need to decide on their preferred
hedging approach and they do so simultaneously by aiming to minimise their costs while taking the actions of the
other LPs as given. A Nash equilibrium is reached when none of the LPs have an incentive to – unilaterally – change
their hedging decision.
Let’s start by assuming that LP-3 will externalise (c3 is negative after all). LP-1&2’s intention is to internalise
but they may change their approach conditional on LP-3’s strategy. Individually, they will evaluate the following
condition and decide to externalise if:
ci +θP
(2)
i ,2 <θ for i ∈ {1, 2}. (24)
The right-hand side of Eq. (24) measures the cost associated with an internalisation strategy: a guaranteed market
impact cost of θ imposed on LP-i by the externalisation strategy of LP-3. The left-hand side measures the costs
associated with switching to externalisation: LP-i incurs a cost of ci but will now avoid the market impact cost with
probability 1−P (2)i ,2 when he reaches the external market ahead of LP-3. If neither LP-1 or LP-2 decide to externalise
then an equilibrium is reached. If only one of LP-1 or LP-2 decide to externalise, then the other needs to re-consider
his strategy as he now faces 2θ of market impact costs. Conditional on the other two LPs externalising, LP-i will
now also externalise if the below condition is satisfied:
ci +θP
(3)
i ,2 +2θP
(3)
i ,3 < 2θ for i = 1 or 2. (25)
See Appendix C for explicit expressions of Eqs. (24 – 25).
Using the above conditions, the equilibrium strategies can be mapped out in the parameter space of λ1 and λ2,
for given {c1, c2, c3,λ3,θ }. Panel A of Figure 8 and Table 3 provides an illustration, setting c1 = 0.100, c2 = 0.075, c3 =
−0.250,λ3 = 10 and θ = 0.2.
In scenario I of Table 3 (contained in the  region of Figure 8), both LP-1 and LP-2 are slower than LP-3 with
λ1 = λ2 = 5: in a race with LP-3 alone LP-i will come second with probability λ3/(λi +λ3) =
2
3 . LP-1’s choice is to
(i) internalise and incur θ = 0.2 of impact costs or (ii) pay c1 = 0.100 to externalise and save θ with probability
1
3 .
Because 0.2< 0.1+0.2× 23 = 0.233, LP-1 decides to internalise. The same applies to LP-2. Because LP-3 is better off
by −c3 compared to internalisation, no LP is inclined to change its hedging decision and equilibrium is reached.
In scenario II (contained in the  region of Figure 8), LP-1 is sufficiently quick to make him want to join the
race to externalise: with a probability of 71% he’ll reach the market before LP-3. The equilibrium is one where LP-1
reduces his impact costs to less than θ , LP-3 is still better off compared to internalisation. LP-2 now incurs 2θ of
market impact but his costs would increase further were he to join the race to externalise.
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Table 3: Incremental hedging costs associated with stack-sweep execution
all externalise all externalise
internalise LP-3 LP-1/3 LP-2/3 all internalise LP-3 LP-1/3 LP-2/3 all
Scenario I: λ1 = 5,λ2 = 5 (λ3 = 10) Scenario IV: λ1 = 15,λ2 = 10 (λ3 = 10)
LP-1 0.000 0.200 0.233 0.400 0.333 0.000 0.200 0.180 0.400 0.260
LP-2 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.208 0.308 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.175 0.295
LP-3 0.250 0.000 0.067 0.067 0.133 0.250 0.000 0.120 0.100 0.220
Scenario II: λ1 = 25,λ2 = 2 (λ3 = 10) Scenario V: λ1 = 8,λ2 = 10 (λ3 = 10)
LP-1 0.000 0.200 0.157 0.400 0.172 0.000 0.200 0.211 0.400 0.322
LP-2 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.242 0.427 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.175 0.264
LP-3 0.250 0.000 0.143 0.033 0.176 0.250 0.000 0.089 0.100 0.189
Scenario III: λ1 = 2,λ2 = 10 (λ3 = 10) Scenario VI: λ1 = 20,λ2 = 25 (λ3 = 10)
LP-1 0.000 0.200 0.267 0.400 0.433 0.000 0.200 0.167 0.400 0.278
LP-2 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.175 0.208 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.132 0.221
LP-3 0.250 0.000 0.033 0.100 0.133 0.250 0.000 0.133 0.143 0.276
Note. This table reports the additional hedging costs incurred by the LPs when the trader uses stack-sweep execution and the LPs
hedging decisions are as indicated in the table. The scenarios vary λ1 and λ2 while keeping fixed λ3 = 10 and c1 = 0.100, c2 = 0.075, c3 =
−0.250,θ = 0.2. The equilibrium states are highlighted in bold with colour coding consistent with Figure 8.
In scenario IV (contained in the region of Figure 8), both LP-1 and LP-2 individually decide to join the race. The
equilibrium is reached with all three LPs externalising the trader’s flow. In the related scenario V, the condition in
Eq. (24) is not satisfied for LP-1, i.e. the actions of LP-3 in isolation are not sufficient to make LP-1 change his default
hedging strategy. However, the condition is satisfied for LP-2 which leads LP-1 to re-evaluate and externalise. This
nicely illustrates the cascading nature of the hedging decisions: LP-2 only externalises because LP-3 does, and LP-1
only externalises because LP-2 and LP-3 do, ending up in a state where all LPs externalise when only one of them is
naturally inclined to do so.
5.2 Discussion
Are the equilibrium hedging strategies described above “optimal”? The simple answer is that in some instances
they are clearly not. Consider for instance Scenario IV where all LPs decide to externalise. Here the costs incurred
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Figure 8: Equilibrium hedging strategies with stack-sweep execution
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Note. This chart maps out the equilibrium hedging strategies as a function of λ1 and λ2 while
keeping fixed λ3 = 10 and c1 = 0.100, c2 = 0.075, c3 =−0.250,θ = 0.2.
by every LP are higher compared to the situation where only LP-3 externalises. Similarly, Scenario VI (contained in
the  region of Figure 8) illustrates the case where LP-3 triggers a race to externalise amongst all participating LPs
but given the speed of its competitors everyone ends up worse off compared to the situation where all internalise.
The region defined by the equation below is one where LP-3 ends up bearing higher costs – due to LP-1 and LP-2
imposing significant market impact on him when they reach the market first – than if he had been able to commit
to internalise and not forced LP-1&2 to externalise.
θP (3)3,2 +2θP
(3)
3,3 >−c3. (26)
The equilibrium states described above, even those that are clearly inferior, are stable because no LP is incentivised
to unilaterally change its decision. An agreement amongst the LPs to all internalise in Scenario VI won’t hold because
LP-3 can reduce its costs by non-compliance: he is incentivised to break the agreement short of any commitment
device. This is the classical Prisoner’s dilemma. The optimal “all-internalise” state in the  region in Figure 8 may
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be reached in a repeated game with tit for tat strategies. This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Turning to the choice of execution style, what is the trader advised to do? It is instructive to consider a baseline
setup where the trader aggregates liquidity only from LP-1 and LP-2. In that case, the flow will be fully internalised
irrespective of whether she executes on a full-amount basis or via stack-sweep. Now suppose the trader adds LP-3
into the aggregator. If she executes full amount, then LP-1 and LP-2 can continue to internalise and so any deals
they win will attract minimal price impact. LP-3 will externalise and create market impact, but because the other LPs
don’t participate in the deal request they are unaffected. If, on the other hand, the trader executes via stack-sweep,
after adding LP-3, a race amongst all participating LPs to externalise the flow may ensue – the highest aggregate
cost equilibrium state (0.775 in the example in Table 3, compared to 0.250 for all-internalise or 0.400 for only LP-3
externalises). The trader therefore maximises its footprint and spreads are likely to widen due to the increased costs
imposed on the LPs.
Taking this one step further, if the trader’s flow is genuinely uninformed, it is unlikely she will want to inter-
act with an externalising LP. Because trading in public venues is anonymous (the matching parties face a central
clearing house), the externalising LP will pay a premium on any aggressive executions in the form of an adverse
selection component embedded in the spread. Despite the LP hedging uninformed flow, the maker cannot distin-
guish between informed and uninformed aggressors due to the venue enforced anonymity of counterparts. The
LP that internalises the flow avoids this premium and can reflect that in the nominal and effective spread charged.
This reasoning then suggests that the trader should only include externalising LPs into the aggregator if her flow is
informed and the value of the information content exceeds the adverse selection premium charged on-exchange.
The LP becomes a route to market for the trader and the liquidity it offers is of no intrinsic value. Uninformed flow
therefore gravitates towards over-the-counter markets with pre-deal counterparty transparency (where the trader
can reveal it’s “type”) and flow that is sufficiently informed ends up on anonymous public markets.
Finally, consider the impact of one LP’s hedging decision on the reject rate of another. If LP3 is the only one to
externalise, then the instantaneous market impact θ created translates into an effective lowering of the other LPs’
trade acceptance tolerance levels from δ to δ−θ . An example with conservative parameters illustrates the impact
can be significant: with s = 1,ω = 0.25,σ = 0.50,β = 0.75,ρ = 0.50, N = 3,δ = 0.5, n = 1 the baseline reject rate is
19%, but with one externalising LP the reject rate of the other LPs will jump to 31%. If two LPs externalise and create
a combined impact of 2θ , the reject rate of the other LP further increases to 45%.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the properties of execution in an aggregator where multiple liquidity providers (LPs) compete on
price for a trader’s uninformed flow. Within the context of a simple model, I analyse the effective spread as a repre-
sentative measure of the trader’s all-in transaction costs and show how it is determined by a combination of factors,
including (i) the number of LPs included in the aggregator, (ii) the type of LPs selected, (iii) the trader’s execution
style, (iv) the nominal spread charged by each LP, (v) the LPs’ trade acceptance criteria as well as (vi) intrinsic char-
acteristics of the LPs such as the quality of price discovery and (vii) market volatility. The results highlight intricate
dependencies amongst the LPs’ liquidity provision (e.g. a spread tightening by one LP can impact the reject rate
and revenues of another) and the fragility of execution costs to the type of LPs included in the aggregator (e.g. the
addition of a single LP reluctant to internalise the trader’s flow, can lead to an equilibrium where all LPs externalise
and market impact and collective hedging costs are maximised). The paper makes explicit that best-price execution
doesn’t necessarily lead to the lowest all-in transaction costs and provides traders with a framework to analyse and
evaluate their aggregator design.
How do the theoretical predictions made in this paper translate into practice? A key message of the paper is
that transaction costs are not necessarily lowered by increasing the number of LPs included in the aggregator: with
many competing LPs the observed spread in the aggregator will certainly be tighter (and can even go negative)
than with fewer LPs, but then the nominal spread and trade acceptance criteria will counterbalance this. So from
a theoretical perspective, the number of LPs can be entirely inconsequential in that the same transaction costs can
be achieved with many or with few LPs. In practice, there will be additional considerations. For instance, individual
LPs may have particular strengths and weaknesses and the nature of their liquidity offering may vary (e.g. in terms
of instrument coverage, service levels, platform functionality, amount of liquidity it can offer, etc) so combining a
few can have benefits. Also, a trader may want a minimum number of LPs to participate in the aggregator to ensure
resiliency or to satisfy internal execution guidelines. At the same time, a large number of LPs may be undesirable
as relationship management can get costly, the economic incentives for individual LPs are reduced, and with the
trader less reliant on an individual LP their liquidity provision may become less consistent.
The results presented throughout assume the trader to be entirely uninformed. Despite this, strong adverse
selection effects can arise: competition for flow by the LPs combined with a best-price execution strategy on the
trader’s behalf means that the LP that wins the deal request will suffer from the Winner’s curse. In practice, there
will be traders that execute for exogenous liquidity reasons, but equally there will be those that act opportunistically
based on short-term price predictions and those that seek to exploit temporary mis-pricing or pursue latency arbi-
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trage opportunities. Depending on the nature of the trader’s activity, the adverse selection effects described in the
paper may be magnified and increase the importance of the last-look trade acceptance process as a defensive mea-
sure. The paper also shows that stack-sweep execution in an aggregator with participating LPs keen to externalise
is unambiguously detrimental to transaction costs for an uninformed trader. For informed traders this conclusion
may change, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
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A Preliminaries
I first state some results on conditional expectations of normal random variables that will be used below. Let (x , y ) be bi-variate
normal with mean zero, variances σ2x ,σ
2
y , and correlation ρ. Let φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the density and distribution function of
a standard normal random variable. Forσx = 1, we have
E (x | x >δ) = E (X I(x>δ))
E (I(x>δ))
=
∫∞
δ
xφ(x )d x
1−Φ(δ) =
−φ(x ) |∞δ
1−Φ(δ) =
φ(δ)
1−Φ(δ) .
And so for arbitraryσx we have
E (x | x >δ) =σx E  xσ−1x | xσ−1x >δσ−1x =σx φ(δ/σx )1−Φ(δ/σx ) ≡G (δ,σ2x ), (27)
where the function G is defined for notational convenience. Note that G (0,σ2) =σ
p
2/pi= E ( | x | ).
E ( | a + x | ) = E (a + x | a + x > 0)Pr(a + x > 0)−E (a + x | a + x < 0)Pr(a + x < 0) = 2aΦ(a/σx ) +2σxφ(a/σx )−a . (28)
For a bi-variate normal,
E (x | y >δ) = E  Ey (x | y ) | y >δ= ρσxσyσ2y E (y | y >δ) = ρσxσyσy φ(δ/σy )1−Φ(δ/σy ) . (29)
Using a change of variables and Eq. (29),
E (x | x > y ) = E (x | z > 0) = 2φ(0) σ
2
x −ρσxσyq
σ2x +σ2y −2ρσxσy
=
p
2/pi
σ2x −ρσxσyq
σ2x +σ2y −2ρσxσy
, (30)
where z = x − y and noting that x , z are jointly normal, with E (x z ) =σ2x −ρσxσy and E (z 2) =σ2x +σ2y −2ρσxσy .
E (max(x , y )) = E

x + y
2
+
| x − y |
2

=
1
2
E ( | x − y | ) = (2pi)−1/2qσ2x +σ2y −2ρσxσy . (31)
Also note that E (max(x , y )) = −E (min(x , y )) and so E (max(x , y )−min(x , y )) = 2E (max(x , y )). For tri-variate normal (x , y , z )
we have
E (max(x , y , z )−min(x , y , z )) = 1
2
E
  | x − y | + | x − z | + | y − z |  ,
=
1p
2pi
q
σ2x +σ2y −2ρx ,yσxσy + 1p2pi
Æ
σ2x +σ2z −2ρx ,zσxσz
+
1p
2pi
q
σ2y +σ2z −2ρy ,zσyσz . (32)
B Proofs
Proof ofProposition1. From si = s it follows that S = E (a t −b t ) = s +E (mini {m (i )t }Ni=1−maxi {m (i )t }Ni=1) = s−2E (maxi {m (i )t }Ni=1).
The unconditional variance of the measurement error is V (m (i )t ) = ω2 and independent of β by specification of the process.
Because βi = β , the correlation amongst the measurement error processes is ρ and also independent of β . Now note that
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{m (i )t }Ni=1 d={xi }Ni=1 where xi = ω(ρu0 +
p
1−ρui ) and u are independent standard normal. Therefore, E (maxi {m (i )t }Ni=1) =
E (maxi {xi }Ni=1) = ω
p
1−ρE (maxi {ui }Ni=1). See Aksomaitis and Burauskaite˙-Harju (2009) for more details. Berman (1964)
shows that for large N ,ψN ∝plog N , from which it follows that ∂ 2ψN /∂ N 2 < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the model defined by Eqs. (1 – 4), it is easy to see that Vh = s/2+E (m
(i )
t +h −m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t ). The
expectation can be worked out as follows:
E (m (i )t +h −m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t ) = E ((βh −1)m (i )t +
h−1∑
j=0
β jηt +h− j |m (i )t >m ( 6=i )t ),
= (βh −1)E (m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t ),
= (βh −1)E (max
i
{m (i )t }Ni=1),
= (βh −1)ωp1−ρψN . (33)

Proof of Proposition 3. Starting with the definition of the reject rate in Eq. (10), note that:
R = Pr(b (i )t +n − b (i )t <−δ | b (i )t > b (6=i )t ),
= Pr
 
p ∗t +n −p ∗t +m (i )t +n −m (i )t <−δ |m (i )t >m (6=i )t

,
= Pr
 
n∑
j=1
"t + j +
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +n− j + (βn −1)m (i )t <−δ |m (i )t >m (6=i )t
!
,
= Φ

(1−βn )m (i )t −δp
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2 |m
(i )
t >m
( 6=i )
t

. (34)
To obtain the unconditional probability of a reject, one would need to integrate out the random variable m (i )t conditioned on
m (i )t >m
(6=i )
t . This can be done numerically but it is not analytically tractable. An approximation can be obtained by replacing
the measurement error by its conditional expectation, i.e.
R≈Φ

(1−βn )ωp1−ρψN −δp
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2

. (35)
Because the function Φ(x ) is convex for x < 0 and concave for x > 0, by Jensen’s inequality, the above approximation will
constitute an upper bound (lower bound) when the numerator is sufficiently positive (negative). 
Proof of Proposition 4. I first derive an expression for Vh , defined in Eq. (12). The effective spread then trivially follows from
S= 2V∞.
Vh =
s
2
+ E

p (i )t +h −p (i )t | b (i )t > b (6=i )t , b (i )t +n > b (i )t −δ

,
=
s
2
+ E
 
(βh −1)m (i )t +
h−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +h− j +
h∑
j=1
"t + j |m (i )t >m ( 6=i )t , b (i )t +n > b (i )t −δ
!
. (36)
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The conditional expectation of m (i )t in Eq. (36) can be expressed as:
E
 
m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t , (1−βn )m (i )t <δ+
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +n− j +
n∑
j=1
"t + j
!
. (37)
This is of the form E (x | y < x < z ) and analytically intractable. In order to still obtain a lower bound on S, an upper bound on
the conditional expectation of m (i )t is required (because β
h −1< 0 multiplying m (i )t in Eq. 36):
E
 
m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t , b (i )t +n > b (i )t −δ

= E
 
m (i )t |m (i )t >m (6=i )t , m (i )t <m (i )t +n +δ

< E
 
m (i )t |m (i )t >m ( 6=i )t

=ω
p
1−ρψN . (38)
A lower bound on the second and third term in Eq. (36) for h ≥ n is given by:
E
 
E
 
h∑
j=1
"t + j +
h−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +h− j |
n∑
j=1
"t + j +
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +n− j > (1−βn )m (i )t −δ
!
|m (i )t >m ( 6=i )t
!
= E
 
E
 
n∑
j=1
"t + j +β
h−n
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +n− j |
n∑
j=1
"t + j +
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(i )t +n− j > (1−βn )m (i )t −δ
!
|m (i )t >m (6=i )t
!
,
=
nσ2 +βh−n (1−β 2n )ω2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2 E
 
G ((1−βn )m (i )t −δ, nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2) |m (i )t >m ( 6=i )t

,
>
nσ2 +βh−n (1−β 2n )ω2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2 G ((1−β
n )ω
p
1−ρψN −δ, nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2). (39)
In the first step, I use that the conditional expectation of "t + j and ηt + j is zero for j > n . In the second step I use the result in
Eq. (29), and the final step follows from Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of G . Collecting terms, yields a lower bound on
Vh and the associated expression for S. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The unconditional variance of the measurement error noise is V (m (i )t ) =ω2i and independent of β by
specification of the process. For N = 2, the unconditional correlation between the measurement error processes is:
ρm ≡ 1ω1ω2 limn→∞E0(m
(1)
n m
(2)
n ),
=
1
ω1ω2
lim
n→∞E
 
βn1 m
(1)
0 +β
n
2 m
(2)
0 +
 
n−1∑
j=0
β
j
1 η
(1)
n− j
! 
n−1∑
j=0
β
j
2 η
(2)
n− j
!!
,
=
1
ω1ω2
lim
n→∞E
 
n−1∑
j=0
(β1β2)
jη(1)n− jη
(2)
n− j
!
,
= ρ
Æ
(1−β 21 )(1−β 22 )
1−β1β2 . (40)
The observed spread S =−2E (max(m (1)t − s12 , m (2)t − s22 )) = s1+s22 −E ( |m (1)t −m (2)t + s2−s12 | ) from which it follows using Eq. (28) that
S = s2− (s2− s1)Φ

s2− s1
2σ∆m

−2σ∆mφ

s2− s1
2σ∆m

, (41)
whereσ2∆m ≡ E ((m (2)t −m (1)t )2) =ω21 +ω22−2ρmω1ω2. To obtain the probability of reject for LP-2, I use the same approach as in
the proof of Proposition 3 by noting that:
R2 = Pr(b (2)t +n2 − b (2)t <−δ2 | b (2)t > b (1)t ) =Φ
 
(1−βn22 )m (2)t −δ2q
n2σ2 + (1−β 2n22 )ω22
| b (2)t > b (1)t
!
. (42)
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From Eqs. (29) and (40) it follows that
E (m (2)t | b (2)t > b (1)t ) = E (m (2)t |m (2)t −m (1)t > 12 (s2− s1)) =
ω22−ρmω1ω2
σ2∆m
G (
1
2
(s2− s1),σ2∆m ). (43)
Replacing m (2)t in Eq. (42) by the above expectation yields the required approximation. The reject rate for LP-1 follows by
symmetry.
Following the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 4, the value of a completed trade to LP-2 can be expressed as:
Vh ,2 =
s
2
+ E
 
(βh2 −1)m (2)t +
h−1∑
j=0
β
j
2 η
(2)
t +h− j +
h∑
j=1
"t + j | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n2 > b (2)t −δ2
!
. (44)
An upper bound for the first term in Eq. (44) is:
E

m (2)t | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n2 > b (2)t −δ2

< E
 
m (2)t | b (2)t > b (1)t

=
ω22−ρmω1ω2
σ2∆m
G (
1
2
(s2− s1),σ2∆m ). (45)
A lower bound on the second and third term in Eq. (44) for h ≥ n2 is given by:
E
 
E
 
h−1∑
j=0
β
j
2 η
(2)
t +h− j +
h∑
j=1
"t + j |
n2−1∑
j=0
β
j
2 η
(2)
t +n2− j +
n2∑
j=1
"t + j > (1−βn22 )m (2)t −δ2
!
|m (2)t >m (1)t + s2− s12
!
=
n2σ
2 +βh−n2 (1−β 2n22 )ω22
n2σ2 + (1−β 2n22 )ω22
E

G ((1−βn22 )m (2)t −δ2, n2σ2 + (1−β 2n22 )ω22) |m (2)t >m (1)t + s2− s12

,
>
n2σ
2 +βh−n2 (1−β 2n22 )ω22
n2σ2 + (1−β 2n22 )ω22
G

(1−βn22 )ω
2
2−ρmω1ω2
σ2∆m
G (
1
2
(s2− s1),σ2∆m )−δ2, n2σ2 + (1−β 2n22 )ω22

, (46)
Collecting terms, yields a lower bound on Vh ,2 and the associated expression for S2 (and S1 by symmetry). 
Proof of Proposition 6. For notational convenience, I assume throughout that LP-1 is “fast” and LP-2 is “slow”. The expression
for the observed spread directly follows from Eq. (31):
S =−2E (max(b (1)t , b (2)t )−p ∗t ) = s −E ( |m (1)t −m (2)t−1 +"t | ) = s −E ( | βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t −m (2)t−1 +"t | ) = s −2ψ2
Æ
ω2(1−ρβ ) +σ2/2. (47)
An expression for the probability of reject for LP-slow for n > 1 is derived as follows:
Rslow = Pr
 
b (2)t +n − b (2)t <−δ | b (2)t > b (1)t

,
= Pr

p ∗t +n−1 +m
(2)
t +n−1−p ∗t−1−m (2)t−1 <−δ | p ∗t−1 +m (2)t−1 > p ∗t +m (1)t

,
= Pr
 
n−1∑
j=0
"t + j +
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(2)t +n−1− j +
 
βn −1m (2)t−1 <−δ |m (2)t−1 > "t +βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t
!
,
= Pr
 
n−1∑
j=1
"t + j +
n−2∑
j=0
β jη(2)t +n−1− j +βn−1
p
1−ρ2η∗t <
 
1−βn m (2)t−1−δ− "t −βn−1ρη(1)t |m (2)t−1 > "t +βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t
!
,
= Φ
  
1−βn m (2)t−1−δ− "t −βn−1ρη(1)tp
(n −1)σ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−β 2n (β−2−1)ρ2ω2 |m
(2)
t−1 > "t +βm
(1)
t−1 +η(1)t

,
≈ Φ
 (1−β
n )(1−ρβ)ω2+µslow
ψ−12
p
(1−ρβ )ω2+σ2/2 −δq
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−σ2slow
 , (48)
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where µslow = σ2 +ρ(βn−1 −βn+1)ω2 and σ2slow = σ2 +β 2n (β−2 − 1)ρ2ω2. In the third step, I use that η(2)t d=
p
1−ρ2η∗t +ρη(1)t
with η∗t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, (1−β 2)ω2). The final step uses Eq. (30) to obtain the expressions below:
E

m (2)t−1 |m (2)t−1 > "t +βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t

=
(1−ρβ )ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2,
E

"t | "t <m (2)t−1−βm (1)t−1−η(1)t

= − σ2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2,
E

η(1)t | η(1)t <m (2)t−1− "t −βm (1)t−1

= −
 
1−β 2ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2.
Similarly, an expression for the probability of reject for LP-fast is derived as follows:
Rfast = Pr
 
b (1)t +n − b (1)t <−δ | b (1)t > b (2)t

,
= Pr

p ∗t +n+1−p ∗t +1 +m (1)t +n+1 +m (1)t +1 <−δ | p ∗t +1 +m (1)t +1 > p ∗t +m (2)t

,
= Pr
 
n∑
j=1
"t + j+1 +
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(1)t +n− j+1 <
 
1−βn m (1)t +1−δ | βm (1)t >m (2)t − "t +1−η(1)t +1
!
,
= Φ
  
1−βn βm (1)t +η(1)t +1−δq
nσ2 +
 
1−β 2n ω2 | βm (1)t +η(1)t +1 >m (2)t − "t +1
!
,
≈ Φ
 (1−β
n )(1−ρβ)ω2
ψ−12
q
(1−ρβ)ω2+σ2/2 −δq
nσ2 +
 
1−β 2n ω2
 . (49)
The value of a completed trade to LP-slow for n > 1 is:
Sslow = 2 lim
h→∞Vh ,2,
= s +2 lim
h→∞E

p (2)t +h −p (2)t | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ

,
= s +2 lim
h→∞E
 
(βh −1)m (2)t−1 +
h−1∑
j=0
β jη(2)t +h− j−1 +
h∑
j=1
"t + j−1 | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ
!
,
= s +2E
 
n∑
j=2
"t + j−1 | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ
!
+2E
 
"t | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ
−2E m (2)t−1 | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ .
Working through each term separately:
E
 
n∑
j=2
"t + j−1 | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ
!
= E
 
E
 
n∑
j=2
"t + j−1 | βn−1p1−ρ2η∗t + n−2∑
j=0
β jη(2)t +n− j−1 +
n∑
j=2
"t + j−1 > (1−βn )m (2)t−1−δ− "t −ρβn−1η(1)t
!
|m (2)t−1 >βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t + "t
!
,
=
(n −1)σ2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−σ2slow E

G ((1−βn )m (2)t−1−δ− "t −ρβn−1η(1)t , nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−σ2slow |m (2)t−1 >βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t + "t

,
>
(n −1)σ2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−σ2slow G

(1−βn )(1−ρβ )ω2 +µslowp
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2 ψ2−δ, nσ
2 + (1−β 2n )ω2−σ2slow

.
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Next,
E
 
"t | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ

> E
 
"t | b (2)t > b (1)t

= E

"t |m (2)t−1 >βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t + "t

=− σ2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2.
Finally,
E

m (2)t−1 | b (2)t > b (1)t , b (2)t +n > b (2)t −δ

< E

m (2)t−1 |m (2)t−1 >βm (1)t−1 +η(1)t−1− "t

=
(1−ρβ )ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2.
To obtain the value of a completed trade for the fast LP:
Sfast = 2 lim
h→∞V
fast
h ,1
= s +2 lim
h→∞E

b (1)t +h − b (1)t | b (1)t > b (2)t , b (1)t +n > b (1)t −δ

,
= s +2E
 
−m (1)t +1 +
n∑
j=1
"t + j | b (1)t > b (2)t , b (1)t +n > b (1)t −δ
!
.
An upper bound for the first term is:
E
 
m (1)t | b (1)t > b (2)t , b (1)t +n > b (1)t −δ

< E

m (1)t |m (1)t >m (2)t−1− "t

=
(1−ρβ )ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2. (50)
A lower bound for the second term is:
E
 
E
 
n∑
j=1
"t + j |
n−1∑
j=0
β jη(1)t +n− j +
n∑
j=1
"t + j > (1−βn )m (1)t −δ
!
| b (1)t > b (2)t
!
=
nσ2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2 E

G ((1−βn )m (1)t −δ, nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2) |m (1)t >m (2)t−1− "t

,
>
nσ2
nσ2 + (1−β 2n )ω2 G

(1−βn )(1−ρβ )ω2p
(1−ρβ )ω2 +σ2/2ψ2−δ, nσ
2 + (1−β 2n )ω2

.

C Stack execution equilibrium boundaries
The condition in Eq. (24) where LP-i is better off externalising when LP-3 does so, can be expressed as:
λi > ci
λ3
θ − ci for i ∈ {1, 2}
The condition in Eq. (25) where LP-i is better off externalising when LP- 6= i and LP-3 do so, can be expressed as:
λi >
(ci −θ )  λ3 +λ6=i +Çci  λ3−λ6=i 2 (ci −2θ )+θ 2  λ3 +λ6=i 2
2 (2θ − ci ) for i ∈ {1, 2},
where (6= i ) = 1 if i = 2 and vice versa. Sometimes it is useful to translate the condition on λ1 in terms of λ2 into a condition on
λ2 for given λ1:
λ2 <−λ1 c1λ1−2θλ1−θλ3 + c1λ3c1λ1 + c1λ3−θλ1
The no-regret condition for LP-3 in (26) can be expressed as:
λ2 >−λ3 c3λ1 + c3λ3 +θλ1c3λ1 +2θλ1 +θλ3 + c3λ3
37
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